

## Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0277

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR SPC  
EXPERTS MEETING

1. IN ADDITION TO QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN STATE 135536,  
FOLLOWING ARE SEVERAL QUESTIONS WHICH DELEGATION BELIEVES  
ARE LIKELY TO ARISE DURING THE SPEC EXPERTS MEETINGS ON  
OPTION III ON 23 AND 24 JUNE. WE HAVE PREPARED DRAFT  
ANSWERS FOR MOST OF THESE QUESTIONS. REQUEST WASHINGTON  
REVIEW AND PROVISION OF ANSWERS PREFERABLY BY 20 JUNE  
AND IN ANY EVENT PRIOR TO THE EXPERTS MEETING.

2. IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT, FOLLOWING A CSCE SUMMIT AND A SALT  
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II AGREEMENT, THE SOVIETS WILL START MAKING CONCESSIONS,

AS THEY ARE DOING NOW UNDER TIME PRESSURE IN CSCE? SHOULD WE NOT SHOW MORE PATIENCE IN NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIETS AND WAIT BEFORE PUTTING IN OPTION 3?

AFTER CSCE IS CONCLUDED, THE WEST WILL BE IN A POSITION TO SLIGHTLY INCREASE PUBLIC OPINION PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS, BUT WE DOUBT THAT THIS WOULD BE ENOUGH ITSELF TO BRING SIGNIFICANT SOVIET MOVEMENT OR THAT SOVIETS WOULD CONSIDER CSCE CONCLUSION GROUNDS TO DEPART FROM THEIR BASIC POSITIONS IN THE VIENNA TALKS.

AS REGARDS SALT, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT CONCLUSION OF A SALT AGREEMENT WOULD BRING CLEAR BENEFITS FOR MBFR. ONLY IF A SALT AGREEMENT RESULTED IN A CLEAR NET ADVANTAGE TO THE EAST WOULD THERE BE A WESTERN CASE FOR A SOVIET PAYOFF IN MBFR. THIS IS NOT THE KIND OF SALT AGREEMENT WE WOULD ACCEPT.

3. WHAT IF OPTION 3 IS NOT ENOUGH? WHAT ELSE WOULD YOU BE PREPARED TO DO IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE ALLIED OBJECTIVES LIKE THE COMMON CEILING? (WHAT ABOUT EUROPEANS IN PHASE ONE AND CONFLATION?)

A. THE US VIEWS PAPER INDICATES THAT WE HAVE CONSIDERED A BROAD RANGE OF ALTERNATIVES TO INTRODUCING OPTION III. WE CONCLUDED THAT OPTION III OFFERED THE BEST CHANCE OF ACHIEVING OUR NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES. (NSP, PARAS 5-9).

B. IF OPTION III FAILS, THE ALLIANCE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER WHAT TO DO THEN.

C. ONE POSSIBLE COURSE, IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, SUGGESTED IN THE PAPER ITSELF (PARA 21) WOULD BE TO REST ON OUR POSITION AND ALLOW WESTERN PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY OPINION TO DRAW THE APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS FROM SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE IN THE FACE OF A REASONABLE WESTERN OFFER.

4. SHOULDN'T WE PRESS THE EAST FOR A COMMON CEILING ON ALL ARMAMENTS SET AT A SPECIFIC LEVEL?

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NO, IT WOULD DESTROY THE RATIONALE OF THE MIXED PACKAGE APPROACH IN FAVOR OF ONE BASED ON ACROSS-THE-BOARD REDUCTIONS.

FURTHERMORE, IT IS UNLIKELY TO BE NEGOTIABLE. IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR BOTH SIDES TO ARRIVE AT AN AGREED NUMERICAL COMMON CEILING FOR INDIVIDUAL ARMAMENTS. IN THE CASE OF TANKS, FOR EXAMPLE, A CEILING COULD BE SET AT A HIGH LEVEL (SOVIET TANK LEVEL IN THE NGA) WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE WEST TO BUILD TO

THAT LEVEL. CONVERSELY, THE LEVEL COULD BE BASED AT A LOW LEVEL (US INVENTORY) WHICH WOULD REQUIRE EASTERN REDUCTIONS. NEITHER APPROACH IS NEGOTIABLE. ALTHOUGH AN INTERMEDIATE LEVEL IS POSSIBLE, AN AGREED RATIONALE TO SUPPORT A SPECIFIC NUMBER WOULD BE HARD TO COME BY.

IN CASE OF TACTICAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT, THE SAME PROBLEMS WOULD ARISE.

5. WHAT WOULD BE THE OVERALL IMPACT OF THE OPTION 3 WITHDRAWALS ON THE NATO DEFENSE POSTURE?

NATO'S ABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF WITH THREATEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THUS NATO'S DETERRENT POSTURE, WILL REMAIN FULLY ADEQUATE BY VIRTUE OF THE SIZE OF THE FORCES, US AND ALLIED, THAT REMAIN IN THE NEGA FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL OF THE NUCLEAR ELEMENTS WE PROPOSE.

6. WILL THESE WITHDRAWALS DECREASE NATO FIREPOWER AND CAPACITY FOR FLEXIBLE RESPONSE? WILL THESE WITHDRAWALS HAVE A DECOUPLING EFFECT?

--AS WE POINTED OUT IN OUR PAPER (PARA 13), NATO WILL RETAIN ALL PRESENT TYPES OF NUCLEAR DELIVERY CAPABILITY, AND CONSEQUENTLY ALL PRESENT FLEXIBILITY. WITH THE NUMBER OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND WARHEADS THAT WILL BE AVAILABLE TO SACEUR, THE GENERAL STRIKE PLAN TARGETS CAN STILL ADEQUATELY BE COVERED.

--IN THE EVENT OF NEED, US PLANS PROVIDE FOR THE RAPID RETURN OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE COMBAT AIRCRAFT. PERSHING SSMS MIGHT NOT BE RETURNED BUT OTHER MISSILE CAPABILITIES COULD BE AVAILABLE TO SACEUR, SUCH AS POSEIDON. THE  
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RETURN OF NECESSARY TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS PRESENTS NO SIGNIFICANT LOGISTICS PROBLEMS.

--THERE WILL BE NO DECOUPLING EFFECT. EVEN WITH THE PLANNED OPTION 3 WITHDRAWALS, NATO WILL RETAIN THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL DELIVERY SYSTEM CAPABILITIES WHICH MAKES UP THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR LEG OF NATO'S TRIAD. ONE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE WHOLE EXERCISE IS TO MAINTAIN A SIZEABLE CONVENTIONAL US FORCES IN EUROPE. IF SUCCESSFUL, OPTION 3 WILL HELP TO THIS END.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0277

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

7. WHEN DO YOU WANT TO BE IN A POSITION TO TABLE  
OPTION 3 WITH THE EAST? YOUR PAPER SAYS AT AN  
EARLY DATE. WHAT DO YOU HAVE IN MIND?

WE WOULD LIKE TO DO THIS AS SOON AS ALLIANCE CONSULATION  
CAN BE COMPLETED. WE SUGGEST THAT SETTING THE EXACT TIME SHOULD  
BE SEPARATED OUT FOR SPECIAL LATER CONSIDERATION BY NATO.

8. WOULD NOT OPTION 3 INEVITABLY INCREASE THE SOVIET'S  
POSSIBILITIES FOR DROIT DE REGARD AND BASIS FOR  
INTERFERENCE WITH WEST EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND  
WITH WESTERN DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS?

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DO YOU REALLY THINK THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO RESTRICT LIMITATIONS ON ARMAMENTS TO WITHDRAWN US AND SOVIET ITEMS? WON'T THE SOVIETS INEVITABLY PRESS FOR LIMITATIONS TO BE APPLIED TO ALL MAJOR ARMAMENTS OF BOTH US AND USSR, OR AT LEAST PRESS FOR EXTENDING THE SAME LIMITATIONS TO NATO AS THE US HAS ACCEPTED FOR ITSELF. WON'T WE END UP WITH A LIMIT ON ALL NATO MAJOR ARMAMENTS, INCLUDING TANKS AND COMBAT AIRCRAFT?

A. IN CHOOSING BETWEEN PLACING RESTRICTIONS ON THE SOVIETS AND ALLIED FLEXIBILITY, WE HAVE AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED THE LATTER, SO THAT OUR PROPOSED APPROACH IN FACT ENDS UP WITH THE MINIMUM LIMITATIONS ON BOTH US AND USSR CONSISTENT WITH AN EFFECTIVE AGREEMENT AND WITH MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY FOR NATO.

B. ONE MAJOR RATIONALE FOR OPTION 3 IS THAT IT IS BASED ON TRADING OFF DIFFERENT THINGS, THOSE FORCE ELEMENTS EACH SIDE CONSIDERS MOST THREATENDING, RATHER THAN ACROSS THE BOARD REDUCTIONS.

C. IT IS TRUE THAT OPTION 3 REDUCTIONS OF THIS KIND WOULD RESULT IN LIMITATIONS ON THOSE ARMAMENTS EXPLICITLY BARGAINED FOR AND REDUCED BY AGREEMENT. WITHOUT SUCH LIMITATIONS, THERE CAN BE NO MEANINGFUL WITHDRAWAL.

D. BUT WE BELIEVE IT POSSIBLE TO FORMULATE AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD DEFINE US OBLIGATIONS BOTH NARROWLY AND CLEARLY, AND TO LIMIT THE EASTERN RIGHT TO RAISE QUESTIONS TO THESE AREAS OF US ARMAMENTS ONLY.

E. IN ONE RESPECT, THE QUESTION OF LIMITING SOVIET NUCLEARS, WE SUGGEST DEPARTING FROM THIS PRINCIPLE. WE THINK WE CAN RESTRICT THE CONSEQUENCES FROM THIS MOVE AS REGARDS OTHER US ARMAMENTS TO AN ACCEPTABLE LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF US TANKS.

F. AS REGARDS EXTENSION TO THE ALLIES, THE POSITION WE FAVOR IS THAT EXTENSION OF US ARMAMENTS TO THE NATO ALLIES  
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IS NOT APPROPRIATE AND THAT THE ONLY LIMITATION ON ALLIED ARMAMENTS APPROPRIATE FOR PHASE I SHOULD BE THE INDIRECT LIMITATION FROM THE COLLECTIVE NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON ALLIED MANPOWER.

G. WE THINK THAT, TAKEN TOGETHER, THESE POINTS REPRESENT A

POTENTIAL SOLUTION TO THE ARMAMENTS LIMITATION PROBLEM WHICH WOULD  
RETAIN MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY FOR NATO FOR THE FUTURE.

H. OF COURSE, IT WILL BE THE JOB OF THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS  
TO EVALUATE OUR ANSWERS TO THESE ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM TO  
SEE WHETHER THEY ARE THE BEST WHICH CAN BE ARRIVED AT.

9. HOW COULD VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWAL OF US NUCLEAR  
ELEMENTS BE CARRIED OUT? (NOTE: ANSWER ALREADY  
AVAILABLE FOR WARHEADS)

10. THE DEFINITION OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT IN THE US PAPER  
APPEARS TO BE QUITE BROAD AS IT ENCOMPASSES BOTH AIR DEFENSE  
AND GROUND ATTACK/STRIKE AIRCRAFT. WHY HAS THE US SELECTED  
SUCH A BROAD DEFINITION?

--WE HAVE STUDIED A NUMBER OF ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS IN  
GREAT DETAIL AND HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE "MODEL" DEFINITION  
IS PREFERABLE BECAUSE IT:

-- PROVIDES THE HIGHEST RESIDUAL CEILING FOR NUCLEAR  
CAPABLE AIRCRAFT (157 US), THUS,

---PERMITTING FORCE STRUCTURING FLEXIBILITY AND  
ATTAINMENT OF MODERIZATION PLANS

-- MINIMIZES EASTERN INTERFERENCE IN OUR FORCE STRUCTURING  
AND MODERIZATION.

-- DOES NOT LIMIT CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT (NON-NUCLEAR  
CAPABLE AIRCRAFT), I.E., AIRCRAFT NOT PHYSICALLY  
CAPABLE WITHOUT MODIFICATION OF DELIVERING NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS; SUCH AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE  
LIST OF NUCLEAR CAPABLE MODELS.

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-- AVOIDS PROBLEM OF DETERMINING "INTENT" IN THE CASE  
OF DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT BY FOCUSING ON "CAPABILITY."

PRECLUDES SENSITIVE, CONTENTIOUS ISSUES SUCH  
AS WAR PLAN TASKING, BASING AND PROXIMITY OF  
BASES TO NUCLEAR STORAGE SITES. (SOVIETS WILL  
HAVE REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT EXCLUDED AIRCRAFT  
ARE NOT IN FACT NUCLEAR CAPABLE BASED ON 1) OUR  
PLEDGE, AND 2) THEIR INTELLIGENCE (OPEN SOURCES  
SUCH AS TRADE JOURNALS, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, SECDEF STATEMENTS?  
COVERTLY OBTAINED AIRCRAFT TECHNICAL PUBLICATIONS, INFO  
REGARDING UNIT TASKING, TRAINING PROGRAMS, ETC.))

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0277

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

-- IT IS MORE EASILY VERIFIED THAN "TASKING" DEFINITION

-- IS MORE DIFFICULT TO CIRCUMVENT THAN "TASKING"

DEFINITION UNDER WHICH EXCLUDED, BUT CAPABLE, AIR-  
CRAFT MIGHT QUICKLY REDEPLOY WITHIN THE THEATER TO  
BASES THAT HAVE WEAPONS AND MUNITION LOADING CREWS.

11. WHAT ABOUT A NARROWER DEFINITION OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT  
IN ORDER TO COVER FEWER ALLIED AIRCRAFT?

- IN DETERMINING AN APPROPRIATE AIRCRAFT DEFINITION  
WE HAVE MAINTAINED THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO RETAIN  
US FORCE STRUCTURING FLEXIBILITY, EVEN AT THE EXPENSE  
OF SOME NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE.

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- WE HAVE CAREFULLY EXAMINED SUCH DEFINITIONS AS

-- USAF F-4 AIRCRAFT

-- COMBAT AIRCRAFT

-- NUCLEAR-TASKED AIRCRAFT

-- NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT BY TYPE (I.E., F-4, F-104)

- WHILE BROADER DEFINITIONS INCREASE THE CEILING LEVEL,  
THEY ALSO CONSTRAIN CONVENTIONAL (NON-NUCLEAR) AIRCRAFT.

- NUCLEAR-TASKED AIRCRAFT IS THE ONLY DEFINITION WE  
FOUND TO BE NARROWER THAN THE "MODEL" DEFINITION; HOWEVER,  
WE DECIDED AGAINST THE "TASKING" DEFINITION BECAUSE IT:

-- INVOLVED THE CONTENTIONS ISSUE OF "INTENT" RATHER  
THAN "CAPABILITY."

-- THERE WAS LITTLE BASIS FOR MUTUAL PERCEPTION OF  
ASSIGNMENT (ORGANIZATION)

-- EASE OF CIRCUMVENTION

-- SENSITIVITY OF WAR PLANS, BASING, ETC.

12. CAN YOU REALLY BE SURE THAT THE US CAN INTRODUCE FOLLOW-ON  
AIRCRAFT INTO THE AREA WITHOUT THE EAST MAKING SERIOUS  
DIFFICULTIES?

- THE US HAS NO PLANS TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR  
CAPABLE AIRCRAFT IN THE REDUCTION AREA. INTRODUCTION OF  
ADDITIONAL NON-NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, SUCH AS THE A-7D (USAF  
VERSION) AND THE F-15, WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY A LIMITATION ON  
NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT.

- IT IS LIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WILL CHALLENGE THE INTRO-  
DUCTION OF EVERY NEW US AIRCRAFT; HOWEVER, NATO WOULD ONLY  
BE OBLIGATED TO ADD NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT MODELS TO

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THE NEGOTIATED LIST OF SUCH AIRCRAFT. ONLY AGREED TYPES  
OF AIRCRAFT ON THIS LIST WOULD BE COUNTED IN DETERMINING



THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT IN THE NGA.

-- WE WOULD NOT PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO INSPECT OUR NEW AIRCRAFT, NOR COULD WE EXPECT THEM TO PERMIT US TO INSPECT THEIRS. NEVERTHELESS, AS THE SOVIETS KNOW, AVAILABLE WESTERN PUBLICATIONS CLEARLY IDENTIFY WHETHER OR NOT AN AIRCRAFT IS CONFIGURED FOR NUCLEAR DELIVERY.

- BY REFUSING TO ADD NON-NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT MODELS TO THE LIST OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT THAT WILL BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE EAST. WE BELIEVE EAST IS AWARE OF WHICH MODELS OF NATO AIRCRAFT ARE CAPABLE OF DELIVERING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHOUT FURTHER MODIFICATION.

13. CAN YOU REALLY BE SURE THAT THE US CAN INTRODUCE MISSILE LAUNCHERS INTO THE AREA WITHOUT THE EAST MAKING SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES?

14. WHY SHOULD WE LIMIT US TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHEN WE ARE NOT LIMITING SOVIET MRBMS?

- WE CANNOT LIMIT SOVIET MRBMS'S IN MBFR BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT IN AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

- AN OFFER TO WITHDRAW EQUIPMENT IMPLIES A WILLINGNESS NOT TO REINTRODUCE THE EQUIPMENT WHICH IS WITHDRAWN.

-- SINCE ONLY US IS REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, FAILURE TO ESTABLISH SOME TYPE OF LIMITATION ON US NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD GREATLY REDUCE THE NEGOTIATING VALUE OF SUCH REDUCTIONS.

-- REDUCTIONS WITHOUT SOME TYPE OF CONSTRAINT ON RE-INTRODUCTION OF REDUCED ELEMENTS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO EASTERN AND WESTERN PARLIAMENTS AND PUBLICS. BECAUSE EASTERN REDUCTIONS EXPECTED IN RETURN FOR OPTION 3 WOULD HAVE ADVANTAGES FOR THE WEST.

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15. WOULDN'T IT BE BETTER TO DROP THE LIMIT ON SOVIET TANKS? IF YOU TRY TO LIMIT SOVIET TANKS, WON'T THE SOVIETS TRY TO LIMIT ANTI-TANK WEAPONS? WOULD THIS BE WORTHWHILE?

- WE THINK IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY, AS WELL AS MILITARILY, UNACCEPTABLE TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT THAT DID NOT PREVENT THE REINTRODUCTION OF REDUCED EQUIPMENT.

- FAILURE TO NEGOTIATE A LIMIT ON SOVIET TANKS, WHICH ARE

THEIR PRIMARY OFFENSIVE WEAPON SYSTEM FOR GROUND COMBAT  
AND THUS, THE MOST DESTABILIZING ARMAMENT, WOULD  
SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF AN AGREEMENT.

- IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY TRY TO LIMIT ANTI-  
TANK WEAPONS; HOWEVER, NATO COULD RESPOND THAT THE  
NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS  
WHICH ARE THE DESTABILIZING ELEMENTS. DEFENSIVE  
SYSTEMS, SUCH AS ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, SHOULD NOT SERIOUSLY  
AFFECT "DEFENSIVE ALLIANCES."

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0277

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

16. YOU HAVE PROPOSED THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD AGREE NOT TO INCREASE  
NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS ANALOGOUS TO THOSE WITHDRAWN BY THE US IN  
SUCH A WAY AS TO UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF AN AGREEMENT. WHAT  
SIZE OF INCREASE IN SOVIET NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS OR US TANKS

COULD UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF AGREEMENT?

-- AN INCREASE OF 5 PERCENT IN THE NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, SSMS WITH A RANGE OVER 500 KM, AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS AFTER THE REDUCTION PROPOSED BY THE US IN PHASE I WOULD RESULT IN THE SOVIETS BEING ABLE TO INCREASE THEIR NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT BY 43 AND THE US TO INCREASE ITS TANKS BY 138.

-- IF AN INCREASE OF 10 PERCENT WAS ALLOWED, THE SOVIETS COULD  
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ADD 87 NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AND THE US 276 TANKS.

-- IF A 15 PERCENT INCREASE WAS ALLOWED, THE SOVIETS COULD ADD 130 AIRCRAFT AND THE US 414 TANKS.

-- THESE CALCULATIONS ARE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:  
SOVIET NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT -- 870; US TANKS -- 2760.

-- ANY INCREASE OVER 5 PERCENT WOULD APPEAR TO UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, AT THE 10 PERCENT LEVEL, THE SOVIETS COULD, WITHIN CONTRACTUAL LIMITS, BE INCREASING THEIR NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT BY 87 AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE US WAS REDUCING ITS NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT BY 54.

17. WHICH SOVIET LAUNCHERS AND AIRCRAFT WOULD BE COVERED IN THE CATEGORY 2 LIMITATION?

LAUNCHERS

-- APPLYING THE PROPOSED US DEFINITION --LAUNCHERS FOR BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 500 KM--NO SOVIET MISSILE LAUNCHERS CURRENTLY KNOWN TO BE IN THE NGA WOULD BE COVERED.

FROGS (70KM) AND SCUD BS (300KM) DO NOT HAVE THAT RANGE.

-- THE SCALEBOARD (925KM) IS DEPLOYED IN THE USSR, INCLUDING THE WESTERN MDS, AND ITS INTRODUCTION WOULD BE PRECLUDED.

-- THE SHADDOCK TACTICAL CRUISE MISSILE SYSTEM (550KM) WOULD NOT BE BARRED, UT IT IS AN OBSOLESCEENT SYSTEM NEVER WIDELY DE-  
PLOYED IN THE GROUND FORCES. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF DEVELOP-  
MENT OF A FOLLOW-ON.

AIRCRAFT

-- WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER SOVIET AIRCRAFT HAVE TO BE SPECIALLY FITTED FOR NUCLEAR DELIVERY NOR, IF SO, WHICH AIRCRAFT ARE SO

EQUIPPED. WE BASE OUR JUDGMENT ON WHETHER A CERTAIN MODEL OF SOVIET COMBAT AIRCRAFT IS NUCLEAR CAPABLE PRIMARILY ON THE BASIS OF WHETHER AIRCRAFT OF THAT MODEL HAVE BEEN USED IN SECRET

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TRAINING FOR THE MISSION.

-- ON THIS BASIS, IN THE NGA WE CONSIDER THE MIG-23 FLOGGER, THE SU-7/17 FITTER (A AND C MODELS), AND LATE-MODEL MIG-21 FISHBEDS (J,K AND L) AS "NUCLEAR-CAPABLE." THERE ARE PRESENTLY SOME 750 OF THESE MODELS IN SOVIET UNITS IN THE NGA, OUT OF A TOTAL SOVIET COMBAT AIRCRAFT OF ABOUT 1400.

-- MIG-25 FOXBAT RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT (B MODEL) AND TRAINERS SERVING NUCLEAR-CAPABLE UNITS ARE ACCORDED A POSSIBLE NUCLEAR DELIVERY ROLE, WHILE OLDER MODEL FISHBEDS (D AND F); RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT (FISHBED H, BEAGLE R); MIG-17 FRESCOES; AND TRAINER AIRCRAFT ASSOCIATED WITH THEM ARE NOT CONSIDERED LIKELY TO HAVE A NUCLEAR DELIVERY ROLE. (SOME OF THESE MAY BE CAPABLE OF SUCCESSFULLY DELIVERING A SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPON, BUT THE SOVIETS APPARENTLY DO NOT ENVISION THEM IN THIS ROLE.)

-- THUS, A CATEGORY II LIMIT ON WHAT WE CONSIDER SOVIET NUCLEAR-CAPABLE PLANES WOULD PRESENTLY STAND AT ABOUT 750. THE SOVIETS ARE MODERNIZING THEIR AIR ELEMENTS IN THE NGA, HOWEVER, REPLACING THE OLDER AIRCRAFT WITH THE LATE MODELS THAT HAVE A DEMONSTRATED NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. THIS PROGRAM WILL PROBABLY GIVE THEM 1,000 "NUCLEAR CAPABLE" MODELS BY THE END OF THE DECADE.

-- AS ALL THE NEW SOVIET FIGHTER AND FIGHTER-BOMBER AIRCRAFT ARE NUCLEAR-CAPABLE MODELS, IMPOSING A CATEGORY II CEILING WOULD HALT THEIR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM AND LEAD TO A DECLINE IN FORCE LEVELS AS OLD AIRCRAFT ARE RETIRED UNLESS THE SOVIETS UNDERTOOK TO PRODUCE WHAT THEY COULD PASS OFF AS A "NON-NUCLEAR" MODEL. (THE SAME SITUATION APPLIES TO CATEGORY III LIMITS ON NSWP AIRCRAFT, BUT MORE SEVERELY AS THEIR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IS LESS ADVANCED.)

18. WHAT ARE THE GAINS FROM A WESTERN PROPOSAL TO LIMIT SOVIET NUCLEARS? WHAT COUNTER-DEMANDS COULD A PROPOSAL FOR LIMITING SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS LEAD TO ? HOW WOULD YOU WEIGH THESE CONSEQUENCES AGAINST THE GAINS?

- A WESTERN PROPOSAL TO LIMIT ANALOGOUS SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS COULD RESULT IN THESE GAINS:

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-- IT COULD HELP BEGIN THE PROCESS WHEREBY THE SOVIETS  
CEASED BUILDING UP THEIR TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES  
IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND CONCENTRATED MORE ON CONVENTIONA  
CAPABILITIES.

-- IT COULD DENY THE SOVIETS CERTAIN FORWARD DEPLOYMENT  
OPTIONS SUCH AS THE SCALEBOARD SSM.

-- IT COULD AFFECT THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF AN AGREEMENT  
IN POSITIVE WAYS BY DEMONSTRATING TO WESTERN PARLIAMENTS  
AND PUBLICS THAT THE SOVIETS HAD ACCEPTED LIMITS WITH  
RESPECT TO THEIR NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN THE AGREED AREA OF  
REDUCTIONS.

- WE EXPECT THAT A PROPOSAL TO LIMIT SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS  
AS PART OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT WILL LEAD THE SOVIETS TO  
ASK FOR A LIMIT ON US TANKS. (NSP, PARA. 38)

- WE BELIEVE THAT THE GAINS OUTWEIGHT THE CONSEQUENCES, BUT  
WE WOULD INSIST THAT THE AGREEMENT ALLOW RESTORATION OF  
US TANK STOCKS IN EARLIER LEVELS. (NSP, PARA. 42).

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 USIE-00

ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02

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INFO USMISSION NATO

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S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0277

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

19. DESPITE BEST INTENTIONS, INCLUSION OF F-4 AIRCRAFT IN THE OPTION 3 PACKAGE CREATES THE POSSIBILITY OF ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPEAN NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT OR ON MODERN AIRCRAFT. WOULDN'T IT BE BETTER TO ELIMINATE THE AIRCRAFT FROM THE PACKAGE?

- THE EAST HAS FREQUENTLY STATED THAT THEY ATTACH THE GREATEST SIGNIFICANCE TO NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS -- PARTICULARLY AIRCRAFT. IF WE ELIMINATE THE F-4'S FROM THE PACKAGE WE WOULD BE DELETING THE BIGGEST MAKE-WEIGHT IN OPTION III, THUS, REDUCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF GAINING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO OUR REDUCTION PROPOSAL.

- WE FEEL THAT ATTAINMENT OF NATO'S PHASE I NEGOTIATING  
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OBJECTIVES, WHICH MAY BE POSSIBLE THROUGH THE USE OF OPTION 3 ELEMENTS, WOULD OUTWEIGHT RESIDUAL CONSTRAINTS ON REDUCED EQUIPMENT. WE ALSO FEEL THAT PROPERLY NEGOTIATED CONSTRAINTS WOULD PERMIT ADEQUATE ALLIED FLEXIBILITY IN FORCE STRUCTURING AND MODERIZATION.

20. THE US SAYS THE ALLIES SHOULD POSTPONE DEFINITIVE DECISIONS AS REGARDS ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS UNTIL AFTER THEY HAVE SEEN THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO A WESTERN PROPOSAL OF OPTION 3? BUT THE POSITION OF SOME ALLIES IS THAT NATO SHOULD DECIDE DEFINITELY BEFORE OPTION 3 IS PUT DOWN AS REGARDS THE APPLICATION OF ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS IN GENERAL, AND ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE ALLIES. WOULDN'T THE APPROACH FAVORING PRIOR AGREEMENT PLACE LESS STRAIN ON ALLIED COHESION?

21. APPARENTLY THE US IS NOT INTENDING TO SEEK LIMITS ON EASTERN EUROPEAN HOLDINGS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR TANKS. WON'T THIS ENCOURAGE CIRCUMVENTION BY THEM?

22. WON'T THE PROPOSED LIMITATIONS ON US NUCLEAR WARHEADS CAUSE THE EAST TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF LIMITS ON UK WARHEADS AND PROHIBITIONS AGAINST THE INTRODUCTION OF FRENCH WARHEADS INTO THE AREA? RESOR

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